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VINTAGE EFFECTS IN HUMAN CAPITAL: EUROPE VERSUS THE 
UNITED STATES
by RobeRt InklaaR* and MaRIanna PaPakonstantInou
Groningen Growth and Development Centre, University of Groningen
The standard assumption in growth accounting is that an hour worked by a worker of given type deliv-
ers a constant quantity of labor services over time. This assumption may be violated due to vintage 
effects, which were shown to be important in the United States since the early 1980s, leading to an 
underestimation of the growth of labor input (Bowlus and Robinson, 2012). We apply their method for 
identifying vintage effects to a comparison between the United States and six European countries. We 
find that vintage effects led to increases of labor services per hour worked by high-skilled workers in the 
United States and United Kingdom and decreases in Continental European countries between 1995 
and 2005. Rather than a productivity growth advantage of the US and UK, the primary difference with 
Continental European countries was human capital vintage effects instead.
JEL Codes: O11, J31, E24
Keywords: human capital, productivity, vintage effects
1. IntRoductIon
Improvements in human capital have long been thought to contribute only 
modestly to economic growth, following the growth accounting method of 
Jorgenson and Griliches (1967).1 For example, Jorgenson et al. (2016, Table 4) 
show that the United States economy grew at an average annual rate of 3.23 per-
cent between 1947 and 2010 and that human capital improvements only contrib-
uted 0.24 percentage points to this total, with little variation in this contribution 
over time.2 Growth accounting relies on the assumption that an hour worked by a 
person of given type—distinguished by education, age and gender—provides a 
constant quantity of labor services over time. Yet this assumption is increasingly 
challenged on both theoretical and empirical grounds as the quality of education 
and post-education accumulation of human capital may change over time; see 
1See Hulten (2010) for a more recent survey.
2Jones (2016, p. 11) shows very similar estimates.
*We would like to thank an anonymous referee, Raquel Ortega-Argilés, Marcel Timmer, the editor 
and seminar participants at the University of Groningen (2016) for helpful comments and 
suggestions.
Correspondence to: Robert Inklaar, Faculty of Economics and Business, Department of Global 
Economics and Management, University of Groningen, PO Box 800, 9700 AV, Groningen, The 
Netherlands (r.c.inklaar@rug.nl).
Review of Income and Wealth
Series 0, Number 0, Month 2018
DOI: 10.1111/roiw.12382
bs_bs_banner
Review of Income and Wealth, Series 0, Number 0, Month 2018
2
© 2018 The Authors. Review of Income and Wealth published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf 
of International Association for Research in Income and Wealth
Lucas (2015). Bowlus and Robinson (2012) contribute to this literature by modify-
ing the growth accounting method to accommodate vintage effects, whereby new 
graduates may differ from previous cohorts in terms of the quantity of labor ser-
vices per hour worked that they supply, for instance due to improved schooling or 
on-the-job training.3 Applying their method to data for the United States between 
1963 and 2008, they find that the quantity of labor services per hour worked by 
college-educated workers increased substantially. As a consequence, they argue 
that there is a larger role for human capital in accounting for US growth than based 
on the traditional ‘constant quantity’ assumption.
An important question is whether the Bowlus and Robinson (2012) results can 
be generalized to a broader set of countries. A comparison with European countries 
is especially interesting as productivity growth in the US accelerated in the mid-1990s, 
while European productivity lagged behind. Standard growth accounting shows no 
important role for differences in human capital improvements in accounting for 
these differences (Timmer et al., 2013), but if  vintage effects led to higher growth 
of (effective) labor input in the US but not in Europe, that could provide a more 
focused target for analysis and economic policy. To address this question, we apply 
the Bowlus and Robinson (2012) method to a more recent period for the US, cover-
ing the 1975–2014 period (using data from the Current Population Survey, CPS) and 
to six European countries – France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the 
United Kingdom—covering the period from the mid-1990s to 2013 (with coverage 
varying by country) using the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) database.
In standard growth accounting, the quantity of labor services provided by a 
given type of worker is assumed to be constant over time. Observing an increase 
in workers’ wages then implies that the price of that type of human capital—the 
price per unit of labor services—has increased. The novelty of the Bowlus and 
Robinson (2012) method is that it drops the assumption that an hour worked by a 
worker of a given skill level delivers a constant amount of labor services over time 
and thus that increases in wages are increases in the price of human capital. The 
method does so by drawing on the literature on life-cycle earnings (Ben-Porath, 
1967) and earlier work by Heckman et al. (1998). The key assumption of Bowlus 
and Robinson (2012) is that changes in the price of human capital (at a particular 
educational level) can be identified only for workers at a late stage in their life cycle, 
at a point where these older workers no longer increase their productivity. Put dif-
ferently, there is a period in a worker’s life cycle during which worker productivity 
is constant, a so-called flat spot range.
This point is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows a smoothed curve of (the log 
of) the median hourly wage of high-skilled workers in the US in 1995 and 2005. 
We draw two important observations from this figure. First, wages increase rapidly 
with age, but after the age of 50 there is no clear trend. This observation, analyzed 
more extensively in Bowlus and Robinson (2012), is at the heart of the empirical 
argument for a flat spot range in human capital accumulation: after a certain age, a 
typical worker’s wage no longer increases, indicating their human capital no longer 
increases. The second observation is that the age-wage profile can change its shape 
over time: the 2005 profile is higher than the 1995 at all points, but substantially 
3We use the term “vintage effects” throughout, but the literature also refers to these as “cohort 
effects”.
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so in the middle of the age distribution and only modestly so after the age of 50. 
These ingredients of the Bowlus and Robinson (2012) method are used to establish 
that this group of workers has increased its human capital, i.e. increased the quan-
tity of labor services per hour worked. In contrast, in standard growth accounting, 
changes in the quantity of labor services per hour worked for a particular type of 
worker are ruled out and this type of wage increases is assumed to reflect a higher 
price for labor services supplied by high-skilled workers in that age range.
The main finding in Bowlus and Robinson (2012) is that, starting around 1980, 
wages of high-skilled workers in the US increased relative to the price of high-skilled 
labor (i.e. the wages of workers in the flat-spot range), while the wages of medi-
um-skilled and (especially) low-skilled workers declined relative to the price of each 
labor type.4 So labor services per hour worked by high-skilled workers increased, while 
labor services per hour worked by medium- and low-skilled workers declined. 
Combined with the increased share hours worked by of high-skilled, this implies that 
standard growth accounting substantially underestimates the contribution of improve-
ments in human capital to US growth and overestimates the role of (multifactor) 
4High-skilled workers have completed tertiary education (ISCED levels 5 or 6), medium-skilled 
workers have completed secondary education (ISCED levels 3 or 4), and low-skilled workers have not 
completed secondary education (ISCED levels 0, 1 or 2).
Figure 1. Age-Wage Profile for High-Skilled Workers in the United States, 1995 and 2005.
Source: Calculations based on the Current Population Survey from IPUMS-CPS (Flood et al., 
2015).
Notes: The figure shows the results for a LOWESS smoother with bandwidth parameter 0.8 
over the median wage at each age for full-time, full-year male employees with a bachelor’s degree 
or above. Wages are deflated using the consumer price index.
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productivity growth, which is determined as a residual. An alternative perspective 
would be that the US saw more embodied and less disembodied technical change. 
Indeed the Bowlus and Robinson (2012) results indicate that uncounted human capi-
tal improvements may have been large enough to eliminate productivity growth 
entirely.
The (simplified) illustration of the Bowlus and Robinson (2012) method in 
Figure 1 points to a limitation of the method: while the method identifies changes 
in the quantity of labor services per hour worked, it does not provide direct evi-
dence on the underlying causes.5 In general, though, based on human capital the-
ory, we can distinguish a set of possibilities. The following examples focus on 
high-skilled (i.e. university-educated) people for expositional ease and because our 
results show most changes in this category. A first explanation could be selection 
effects: if  a larger share of a cohort of pupils enters higher education, this could 
decrease the average ability level and thus lead to lower labor services per hour 
worked for that cohort of university graduates. Alternatively, if  the quality of 
higher education improves later cohorts may leave university with higher levels of 
human capital, allowing these cohorts to provide more labor services per hour 
worked. More, or more effective on-the-job training can also improve labor ser-
vices per hour worked of later cohorts. And finally, technological factors may play 
a role. For example, the increased role of information and communication technol-
ogies (ICT) could particularly benefit high-skilled workers, given the well-estab-
lished complementarity between ICT and high-skilled workers (e.g. Michaels et al., 
2012). Furthermore, this complementarity may be stronger for younger cohorts, 
who are still investing in new skills.
In our analysis, we find that vintage effects continue to be important in the 
United States in recent years. Between 1975 and 2014, labor services per hour 
worked of high-skilled workers have increased by 25 percent when applying the 
Bowlus and Robinson (2012) method. By contrast, labor services per hour worked 
of medium-skilled workers have declined by 9 percent and those of low-skilled 
workers have declined by 20 percent. The declines for medium- and low-skilled 
workers were concentrated in the first half  of the period, until 1995. The increase 
for high-skilled workers was concentrated in the period 1995–2005, which coin-
cides with the period during which US labor productivity growth was (temporarily) 
higher fueled (in part) by rapid ICT investment.6
Within Europe, the UK’s experience is most similar to that of the US, with 
increases of labor services per hour worked by high-skilled workers between 1995 
and 2005. The Continental European countries – France, Germany, Italy and the 
Netherlands—instead show declines of 10 to 14 percent in labor services per hour 
worked by high-skilled workers over this same period. The differences between the 
Anglo-Saxon and Continental European countries remain throughout the sensitiv-
ity analyses that change key assumptions or modify the treatment of the basic data.
These differences suggest that human capital vintage effects were an import-
ant factor in accounting for the productivity growth difference between Europe 
5See also Lagakos et al. (2018) on the difficulties of empirically distinguishing different theories to 
explain differences in labor services per hour worked.
6See e.g. Byrne et al. (2016) on the timing of US productivity growth episodes.
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and the United States between 1995 and 2005, the topic of a sizeable literature.7 
Under standard growth accounting methods, the US and UK had a productivity 
growth advantage over the Continental European countries in our analysis—
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Spain. Accounting for the increases in 
the quantity of labor services per hour worked in the UK and US and the decreases 
in the Continental European countries eliminates most of the differences. Only 
Italy and Spain remain exceptional, with declining productivity over this period. 
Recent research on this topic has emphasized a deterioration in the capital alloca-
tion process in Italy and Spain, suggesting theirs was the exceptional productivity 
growth experience rather than the UK or US.8
As discussed above, the method of Bowlus and Robinson (2012) does not 
clarify the source of the vintage effects—and thus also not why the US and UK 
show increases in labor services per hour worked by high-skilled workers, while the 
Continental European countries show declines between 1995 and 2005. That said, 
the timing of these differences in combination with the broader literature suggests 
that an explanation which fits the observed difference in vintage effects is one that 
centers on the much stronger ICT investment boom in the US and UK starting in 
the mid-1990s.
In measuring vintage effects for human capital, this paper adds to a recent, 
growing literature on this topic. Lagakos et al. (2018) show that experience-earn-
ings profiles are much steeper in high-income economies than in lower-income 
economies. Their analysis is based on a similar approach as that of Bowlus and 
Robinson (2012) and ours, but applied in a cross-country setting. They conclude 
that workers in high-income countries—and especially high-skilled workers are 
able to accumulate human capital more rapidly during their career than workers 
in low-income countries. In a similar vein, Manuelli and Seshadri (2012) find that 
workers in high-income countries have “higher quality” human capital, which may 
also be due to more rapid accumulation of human capital on the job. Further 
empirical support for systematically higher quality of education in high-income 
countries is provided by Kaarsen (2014). Hanushek and Woessmann (2012) show 
that a higher quality of education leads to faster economic growth. These are spe-
cific examples of studies in a more general trend to accommodate a large role for 
human capital in accounting for growth or income level differences; see e.g. Lucas 
(2015) for a general discussion of this stream of literature and Jones (2014) as 
another prominent example of how the traditional growth accounting method is 
likely to understate human capital’s importance by emphasizing imperfect substi-
tutability between workers with different skill levels. Fraumeni (2015) provides a 
more in-depth overview of how different measures of the amount of human cap-
ital in a country can lead to very different rankings across countries, emphasiz-
ing that measurement choices in this area matter substantially. Finally, O’Mahony 
(2012) is an example of what can still be achieved within the scope of the growth 
accounting method by using data about on-the-job training to infer investments 
in human capital during workers’ careers. She also finds that failure to account 
7See e.g. Ortega-Argilés (2013) for a survey or van Ark et al. (2008) for a notable contribution.
8See Cette et al. (2016) and Gopinath et al. (2017).
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for these investments understates the contribution of human capital to economic 
growth.
2. MetHodoloGy
2.1. The Price of Labor Services
The methodology used to calculate the price per unit of labor services is 
based on the work of Bowlus and Robinson (2012). It starts from the premise that 















Between two periods, t−1 and t, changes in wages will thus be determined by 
changes in prices and quantities as:
with Δ as the difference operator. The problem with the above-outlined rela-
tionships is that only the hourly wage is observed and the price and quantity of 
labor services are not, leading to an under-identification problem. To overcome 
this, Bowlus and Robinson (2012) use the insight of  the Ben-Porath (1967) model 
that the quantity of  labor services remains constant at a late stage in a person’s 
working life. When young, people invest in their human capital in the formal 
education system, while no time is spent on work. As they grow older, they allo-
cate their time to both working and producing further human capital through 
on-the-job training. With the age of  retirement approaching, the incentive to 
further invest in human capital disappears, so time is now solely spent on work. 
As a result, the quantity of  labor services enters a flat spot range. Without any 
change in quantity between two periods within this flat spot, one can derive 
changes in prices directly from changes in wages, i.e. Δ log (wt,i)=Δ log (pt). For 
example, if  the flat spot range starts at 51, the price change can be inferred by 
comparing the hourly wage of  51-year olds in year 1 to the wage of  52-year olds 
in year 2.
More specifically, let us assume that all individuals of a given age (and educa-
tion level) in our sample9 are homogenous, so we can summarize the wage within 
each age-education cell as the median across all workers in this cell, denoted by 
log(w̃t,i) for age i at time t. We rely on the median here (as do Bowlus and Robinson, 
2012), because the number of workers in a given age-education cell can be small 
and using the median rather than the mean avoids undue influence from outliers. 
Depending on the length of the flat spot range and the frequency of the surveys we 














9The analysis is limited to male workers that work for the full year and have a full time job; see 
below for further discussion.
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spot range is 10 years and we have annual surveys, N =9 because we compared the 
wage of 51-year olds in year 1 to the wage of 52-year olds in year 2 all the way to 
comparing the wage of 59-year olds in year 1 to the wage of 60-year olds in year 2. 
If  surveys are several years apart, N will be smaller so denote the number of wage 
differences in the flat spot range between years t and 휏 as Nt,휏. Given this notation, 
the price series from t=0,… ,T  for labor services per hour worked can be com-
puted as:
As discussed below, the length of the flat spot range is set to ten years. For 
example, for those who have completed tertiary education in the US, it lies between 
the ages of 50 and 59. This results in a total of nine wage differences (each denoted 
as log(w̃2,i)− log(w̃1,i), for example between years 1 and 2) when data for adjacent 
years are available. We average across these wage differences (in equation (3) this 




log (w̃2,i)− log (w̃1,i)
�
∕9) to derive the price per unit of 
labor services.
We estimate prices per unit of labor services for seven high-income countries 
(France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, UK, US) for various years, and 
three types of workers, distinguished by educational attainment (low, medium and 
high).
2.2. The Flat Spot Range
Bowlus and Robinson (2012) establish the flat spot range based on (cross-sec-
tional) experience-earnings profiles. They conclude that, for high-skilled workers 
in the US, the flat spot occurs between the ages of 50 and 59. To infer the flat spot 
range for workers with lower levels of education, they choose the period at which 
those worker types would have the same length of (post-education) work experi-
ence, which means shifting the flat spot range back by three years for medi-
um-skilled (so ages 47–56) and six for low-skilled (44–53) while keeping the length 
of the range at ten years.10 The important question in our context is whether the US 
flat spot range is suitable for the other countries in the analysis. The flat spot range 












































10The US context typically distinguishes groups “with some college” and “high school graduates,” 
but we group these together for the three-category breakdown more prevalent in international research. 
Sensitivity analysis for the US shows that this compression of the educational categories does not lead 
to qualitatively different results; results are available upon request.
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and an optimizing worker would endogenously choose to stop investing in human 
capital as the end of the working life approaches. This means that the flat spot 
range in a country will be affected by the (expected) retirement age of a person. 
These differ across countries suggesting that the flat spot needs to be adjusted 
accordingly, as earlier retirement decreases the length of the working life and 
affects investment in human capital through on-the-job training (Jacobs, 2014).
To account for differences in the expected retirement age across countries, we 
adjust the flat spot range using information on the effective age of retirement among 
males. The OECD defines this as “the average effective age at which older workers 
withdraw from the labor force.”11 This differs from the official age of retirement (which 
does not show much variation across the countries of our sample) and better captures 
retirement expectations. Table 1 below shows the median effective age of retirement 
among males in the seven countries over the period 1990-2012 (OECD, 2013).12
We know already the flat spot range of the US from Bowlus and Robinson 
(2012). We retain the assumptions that the flat spot (a) lasts for a period of ten 
years13 and (b) that it occurs earlier for those with a lower education level. We cal-
culate the distance between the median value of the US high-skilled flat spot (54.5) 
and the retirement age (64.7) and observe that the high-skilled people reach the 
middle point of their flat spot range approximately ten years before retirement. We 
assume that the same distance applies to the other countries, identify the middle 
point of their high-skilled flat spot and the respective upper and lower bound and 
move the flat spot back accordingly to determine its range for the low- and medi-
um-skilled.14 Table 1 presents the results by country and level of education (low, 
medium, high). These are the country-specific flat spot ranges we subsequently use 
for the calculation of the price per unit of labor services and, although not very 
different between countries, they provide us with a consistent country-ranking 
based on retirement patterns.
The flat spot ranges we have determined are assumed constant over time. This 
means that we assume that, in the period under examination, the effective age of 
11Source: https://www.oecd.org/els/emp/average-effective-age-of-retirement.htm
12For Germany, the data begin in 1996.
13Using a flat spot of five years for the US (for example, 55-59 for high-skilled workers) produces 
prices series that are highly correlated with those using a flat spot of ten years.
14The numbers are rounded to the closest integer to best capture the age range.
TABLE 1
effectIve aGe of RetIReMent and tHe flat sPot acRoss countRIes
Flat Spot
Retirement Age Low-skilled Medium-skilled High-skilled
United States 64.7 44-53 47-56 50-59
France 59.3 39-48 42-51 45-54
Germany 61.2 40-49 43-52 46-55
Italy 60.8 40-49 43-52 46-55
Netherlands 61.0 40-49 43-52 46-55
Spain 61.6 41-50 44-53 47-56
United Kingdom 62.8 42-51 45-54 48-57
Source: Effective retirement age: OECD (2013). Flat spot range United States: Bowlus and 
Robinson (2012); other countries: own calculations.
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retirement has not changed sufficiently to affect decisions on investment in human 
capital. Indeed, the data show that the effective retirement age in the countries of 
the sample has remained rather stable, with only a slow upward trend after 2006. 
Assuming that human capital investment patterns change gradually after changes in 
retirement patterns, we do not expect that the modest increase in the effective retire-
ment age affects our flat spot identification in the time frame we are focusing on.
2.3. Data
The data we use in order to calculate the price per unit of labor services are 
from the Luxembourg Income Study Database (LIS, 2012) for the six European 
countries in our analysis—France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and 
the UK. Data for the US are drawn from the US Current Population Survey, as 
made available through IPUMS-CPS.15 LIS collects and harmonizes survey data 
on socio-demographic and labor market characteristics, as well as income, at 
both the individual- and household-level.16 Data are available for forty-nine 
countries over multiple years between 1967 and 2014.
We focus on six European countries over the 1990–2013 period, prioritizing 
the larger European countries.17 In processing these data, we have taken special 
care to ensure consistency over time in variable definitions, to ensure comparability 
across countries and over time. Table 2 lists the main LIS variables we employ 
alongside a short definition.
The sample we analyze in order to construct the prices per unit of labor ser-
vices consists of men of an age that falls within the country-specific flat spot range 
we have identified. Following Bowlus and Robinson (2012), females are excluded 
because of the fluctuations in their labor force participation. The self-employed are 
excluded as well. Furthermore, we only keep those employed full-time, full-year 
with a positive income (larger than or equal to one). As full-time full-year, we 
define those with at least thirty-five weekly hours and forty annual weeks worked. 
Income variables are deflated using the consumer price index and (for euro area 
countries) converted to euros for the full period. The hourly wage is constructed 
using information on the annual paid employment income (pmile) and a person’s 
weekly hours (hours) and annual weeks (weeks) worked.18
Based on a person’s completed level of education (educ), we derive prices for 
three categories of workers, as defined in Table 2. We calculate the median hourly 
wage by age and education level, and subsequently its log change between two 
points in time. Based on the methodology outlined above (equation 3), we then 
infer changes in the price per unit of labor services. A limitation of the LIS data is 
that it does not provide an annual series of surveys. We can directly implement the 
procedure from equation (3) for the United States, and thus have nine changes in 
15See Flood et al. (2015); this allows us to have an annual time series covering the period since 1975.
16LIS uses as data sources national surveys such as the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) 
and the UK’s Family Resources Survey (FRS).
17Expanding the set of countries would lead to shorter time coverage, since complete information 
on the required variables is typically a problem, especially when moving back in time.
18For the UK, data on the number of weeks worked is missing, so “full-year” employment cannot 
be used as a criterion and we can only divide the overall employment income by weekly hours.
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wages to average over the flat spot range. For the European countries, there is a 
survey in (for instance) 1993 and 1999 for the Netherlands,19 which means that 
rather than comparing the wage of a 49-year old to that of a 50-year old in the next 
year, the comparison is between a 49-year old in 1993 and a 55-year old in 1999. 
Since the data for the United States are available annually from the CPS, but also 
at similar intervals in the LIS data, we use a comparison between calculations 
based on the two sources to establish that the price series based on gaps in survey 
coverage are comparable to those based on annual survey data.
In the UK, data on the variable educ are missing for the year 1994, but not for 
other years in our analysis. We do have information on an individual’s age when 
completed education for 1994, as well as in other years.20 To incorporate data for 
1994 in the analysis, we identify the typical education level at a given age of educa-
tion completion. Based on this, we find that low-skilled workers are those who 
complete their education at or before the age of 15, medium-skilled between ages 
16 and 20 and high-skilled are those who complete their education after age 21.
3. Results
3.1. The price and quantity of labor services per hour worked—United States
An important outcome of our analysis is estimates of the price per unit of 
labor services for workers of different educational backgrounds. Bowlus and 
19See Appendix Table A1 for the list of LIS surveys per country that we use in our analysis.
20“When he/she last attended continuous full-time education,” variable edcage in LIS.
TABLE 2
lIst of lIs vaRIables and defInItIons
LIS variable LIS variable definition
age Age in years
sex Sex
educ Highest completed education level
This variable is recoded into three categories:
(a) low: less than secondary education completed (never attended, no 
completed education or education completed at the ISCED levels 0, 1 or 2)
(b) medium: secondary education completed (completed ISCED levels 3 or 4)
(c) high: tertiary education completed (completed ISCED levels 5 or 6)
pmile Paid employment income
Monetary payments received from regular and irregular dependent 
employment
hours Weekly hours worked, any information
Regular hours worked at all jobs currently held (including family work and 
overtime, whether paid or unpaid)
weeks Annual weeks worked, any information
Number of weeks worked during the year in any job
emp Employed
Dummy that distinguishes the employed from the non-employed
status1 Status in employment (in first job)
Variable that distinguishes the dependent-employed from the self-employed
Source: Documentation-LIS (available online at: https://www.lisdatacenter.org/wp-content/
uploads/our-lis-documentation-variables-definition.xlsx)
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Robinson (2012, Figure 3) find that, in the US, the price per unit of labor services 
evolves similarly for each skill level, which leads them to conclude that changes 
in relative wages between skills levels represent (primarily) changes in the relative 
quantity of labor services per hour worked, rather than changes in relative prices. 
In Table 3, we show that our own calculations for the US provide a perspective 
that is not notably different. The first line shows our estimates for the 1975–2014 
period, the full length of our study period for the US. While the price of high-
skilled units of labor services has declined by less than that of medium- and low-
skilled labor services, this is not a persistent difference.21 The second line shows 
estimates based on the annual CPS data for 1991–2013, which corresponds to the 
period for which LIS data are available. The third line shows results based on LIS 
data for the 1991–2013 period.
The LIS data, for both the US and Europe, are not available annually but 
at intervals of  typically three or four years, so lines two and three are useful to 
gauge the impact of  annual data vs. multi-year gaps in the time series. The main 
difference is that the computation of  price changes (equation (3)) can use fewer 
wage changes if  there are gaps in the time series. For example, with annual data, 
the wage of  50-year old high-skilled workers in year 1 can be compared to 51-year 
old high-skilled workers in year 2, all the way to 58-year olds in year 1 and 59-year 
olds in year 2. As a result, the price change is based on the average of  nine wage 
changes (N =9 in equation (3)). In contrast, if  wages are observed in year 1 and 
next in year 4, the price change is an average of  7 wage changes (N =7 in equation 
(3)), comparing 50 year old to 53 year old high-skilled workers until 56 year old 
to 59 year old workers. There is no reason to suspect that this would impart a sys-
tematic bias to the price change estimates, but comparing lines 2 and 3 in Table 3 
allows us to verify this. For low-skilled and high-skilled workers, the differences 
are small; for medium-skilled workers the differences are larger. Yet, as we show 
in Appendix Figure A1 by charting the full time series for the three skill levels, this 
larger difference is not a sign of  a systematic deviation between the two sources 
but a one-off  outlier. This gives us greater comfort in relying on LIS data for the 
analysis of  the European countries, below. At the same time, the results in Table 3 
(as well as those for the European countries, in Table 5 below) suggest that the 
conclusion of  “no relative price changes” by Bowlus and Robinson (2012) seems 
not warranted in general. So while Bowlus and Robinson (2012) disregard relative 
price movements when analyzing changes in the quantity of  labor services per 
hour worked, we will use the observed price changes from Table 3 (and Table 5) 
when decomposing the overall wage into a price and quantity component, as in 
equation (1).
Figure 2 shows the quantity of  labor services per hour worked in the US 
between 1975 and 2014, computed by dividing the median wage of  (full-time, 
full-year male) workers between the ages of  26 and 60 of  a given educational 
attainment by the price per unit of  labor services for that level of  educational 
21Our results also closely match those of Bowlus and Robinson (2012, Figure 3).
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attainment, i.e. by applying equation (1). The figure shows the annual series 
(solid line) as well as an estimate of  the longer-run trend, computed using a 
LOWESS smoother with a bandwidth of  0.5.22 The labor services per hour 
worked of  high-skilled workers increased substantially over this period, rising by 
25 percent compared to 1975, with most of  this increase (19 percent) occurring 
between 1995 and 2005. There has been a decline in labor services per hour 
worked of  medium-skilled workers of  approximately 10 percent, with a sustained 
decline between 1975 and 1995 and fluctuations around this level in the subse-
quent period. Labor services per hour worked of  low-skilled workers also 
declined, by 20 percent, with sustained declines between 1975 and 1995. This 
periodization is somewhat arbitrary, also given the, sometimes large, year-to-year 
fluctuations in the series. The estimated trends suggest that salience of  the 1975–
1995 period for medium- and low-skilled workers and of  the 1995–2005 period 
for high-skilled workers may not be as large, but notable differences remain in the 
pattern of  changes over time.
22The LOWESS smoother creates a curve to best capture the trend of labor services per hour 
worked. It is the result of a locally weighted regression of labor services per hour worked on time/year.
Figure 2. Labor Services per hour Worked in the United States, 1975–2014. 
Source: Computations based on CPS data from IPUMS-CPS (Flood et al., 2015). 
Notes: The solid lines show the annual time series of labor services per hour worked, the 
dashed line is the LOWESS trend estimate (bandwidth of 0.5). Labor services per hour worked are 
computed by dividing the median wage of full-time, full-year male workers between the ages of 26 
and 60 of a given educational attainment by the price per unit of labor services of that educational 
level (see Table 3) and normalized to one in the initial year, 1975.
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To establish that the patterns in Figure 2 are not mere noise in a statistical 
sense, the first row of Table 4 shows the coefficients of a linear time trend for the 
(log of) labor services per hour worked for the age range 26 to 60. This shows a 
significant negative time trend for low-skilled workers, no significant time trend 
for medium-skilled workers, and a positive time trend for high-skilled workers. 
The subsequent rows test the sensitivity of this result and show that similar time 
trends can be observed for narrower age ranges, though with a significantly nega-
tive time trend for medium-skilled workers as well. This indicates that the patterns 
are observed broadly across the (male) population.
3.2. The price and quantity of labor services per hour worked—Europe
We next turn to the European countries, analyzing the trends in relative price 
and then quantities of labor services. The price developments, shown in Table 5, 
are more mixed than in the US, with, for example, France showing similar price 
trends across educational categories, Germany showing price declines for low-
skilled and price increases for high-skilled and the UK showing the reverse pat-
tern of price increases for low-skilled and price decreases for high-skilled labor 
services. This variety of patterns remains intact through a range of sensitivity 
checks (see below) and does not lend itself to easy explanation. This more firmly 
TABLE 3
tHe cHanGe In tHe PRIce PeR unIt of laboR seRvIces In tHe unIted states
Change in the price per unit of labor services
Source Period Low-skilled Medium-skilled High-skilled
CPS 1975-2014 -0.24 -0.20 -0.18
CPS 1991-2013 -0.01 -0.11 -0.06
LIS 1991-2013 -0.02 -0.18 -0.04
Source: Computations based on LIS data (LIS, 2017) and CPS data from IPUMS-CPS (Flood 
et al., 2015).
Notes: The price per unit of labor services is computed based on equation (3) and the flat spot 
ranges in Table 2. Each entry in the table indicates the change in price over the stated period, relative 
to the change in the country’s consumer price index.
TABLE 4
lIneaR tIMe tRend of laboR seRvIces PeR HouR WoRked In tHe unIted states, 1975–2014
Low-skilled Medium-skilled High-skilled
Age 26-60 -0.0067*** -0.0007 0.0069***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Age 26-35 -0.0044*** -0.0015** 0.0052***
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0004)
Age 36-45 -0.0058*** -0.0025*** 0.0056***
(0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0005)
Notes: N =40N = 40N = 40N = 40N = 40. Each entry in the table is the coefficient of a linear 
time trend on the log of labor services per hour worked in a given age range and level of educational 
attainment. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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establishes the need to account for these price changes when analyzing the trends 
in the quantity of labor services per hour worked.
To analyze the trends in the quantity of labor services per hour worked across 
European countries, we first pool the country-level results. We compute a weighted 
average across the six European countries of labor services per hour worked, first 
linearly interpolating between LIS-covered years and then using the share of each 
country in total employment by educational attainment as weights.23 Due to varia-
tion in country coverage over time, we construct a “Europe” series starting in 1994 
and ending in 2013.
Figure 3 shows the development of  the quantity of  labor services per hour 
worked for the six European countries, on the same scale as Figure 2 for the US. 
There is no clear trend over time in the quantity of  labor services per hour 
worked for any level of  educational attainment. This is especially true when tak-
ing the year-to-year swings into account, i.e. it is hard to discern a trend if  an 
increase or decrease of  6 percent in labor services per hour worked can be 
observed.24 This is further confirmed in Table 6, which shows the results from 
regressions of  a linear time trend on the log of  labor services per hour worked 
for all observations for the six European countries. The regressions include 
country fixed effects as the period covered in each country differs (though results 
are not substantively different without fixed effects).25 The only common find-
ing across age groups is that labor services per hour worked of  low-skilled work-
ers have declined, though the rate of  decline is smaller than observed in the US 
(see Table 4).
23Using data from the WIOD Socio-Economic Accounts (Timmer et al. 2015), we assume that 
workers in the UK work 40 weeks per year to accommodate missing data on this variable in LIS.
24Although there seem to be increases in recent years (after the Great Recession), these may be (at 
best) the start of a longer trend rather than an established pattern. Moreover, there is no difference by 
skill level, so even if  this were a clear trend, it would be one of a different pattern.
25Omitting France and Spain from the sample (since data for these countries are scarce and Spanish 
series only begin in 2007) produced regression results similar to those of Table 7.
TABLE 5
tHe cHanGe In tHe PRIce PeR unIt of laboR seRvIces In euRoPe
Change in the price per unit of labor services
Country Period Low-skilled Medium-skilled High-skilled
France 1994-2005 0.12 0.17 0.14
Germany 1994-2013 -0.15 0.07 0.36
Italy 1991-2010 0.04 0.01 0.12
Netherlands 1990-2013 0.07 0.06 0.13
Spain 2007-2013 -0.01 0.15 0.10
United Kingdom 1994-2013 0.11 -0.24 -0.27
Source: Computations based on LIS data (LIS, 2014).
Notes: The price per unit of labor services is computed based on equation (3) and the flat spot 
ranges in Table 2. Each entry in the table indicates the change in price over the stated period, relative 
to the change in the country’s consumer price index.
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Despite these inconclusive patterns for the period as a whole and the full set 
of  European countries, a clearer distinction becomes apparent when zooming in 
on the period of 1995 to 2005. For the United States, this was the period in which 
the largest increases in labor services per hour worked by high-skilled workers 
could be seen, in Figure 2, and this is shown in the first line of  Table 7. When 
selecting the LIS survey years of  each European country to most closely match the 
1995–2005 period,26 the UK stands out amongst the European countries in show-
ing a 25 percent increase in labor services per hour worked by high-skilled work-
ers, while the four Continental European countries show declines of  10 to 14 
percent. For low-skilled and medium-skilled workers the changes in the quantity 
of  labor services per hour worked are typically smaller than for high-skilled work-
ers, though the UK also shows a notable increase for medium-skilled workers. 
Before turning to a discussion of what may be driving these differences for high-
skilled workers and to the implications of  these differences for measured produc-
tivity, we first assess the sensitivity of  the results to the assumptions and choices 
we made.
26Spain is not shown in the table because its price series is only available from 2007 onwards, see 
Appendix Table A1.
Figure 3. Labor Services per hour Worked in Europe, 1994–2013.
Source: Computations based on LIS data (LIS, 2017).
Notes: The solid lines show the annual time series of labor services per hour worked, the 
dashed line is the LOWESS trend estimate (bandwidth of 0.5). Labor services per hour worked are 
computed by dividing the median wage of full-time, full-year male workers between the ages of 26 
and 60 of a given educational attainment by the price per unit of labor services of that educational 
level (see Table 5) and normalized to one in the initial year, 1994. The figure shows a weighted 
average of labor services per hour worked across the six European countries covered (see Table 5), 
using total employment by educational attainment of a country as weights.
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3.3. Sensitivity Analysis
Computing the prices per unit of labor services involves a series of choices 
and judgements, as the preceding discussion has already illustrated. Of particu-
lar note is the determination of the flat spot range. Bowlus and Robinson (2012) 
devote considerable attention to this topic, for instance by showing that moving 
the flat spot range for high-skilled workers to earlier ages would pick up some 
of the upward-sloping wages in a standard, concave earnings-experience pro-
file. We have anchored our own analysis to that of Bowlus and Robinson (2012) 
by using their US flat spot range and adjusting it to reflect differences in effec-
tive retirement age. An alternative is to directly use the US flat spot range for 
European countries.
In addition, we consider a range of treatments of the European LIS data. 
What our results for the US (Table 3) already indicated is that the frequency of 
survey data availability is not an important source of sensitivity, nor is the number 
of educational categories considered (four in Bowlus and Robinson, 2012, three 
in this study). A potential concern could be that the price series we estimate are 
“contaminated” with noise. A reason could be a small number of full-time full-year 
male survey respondents in an education/age cell, which could give wage outliers 
an undue influence on the final price series. By taking the median wage of each 
education/age cell, we already limit the scope for such outlier-induced noise.
In this sensitivity analysis, we consider three additional approaches. The first 
is to trim the top and bottom 2.5 percent of wages in the entire flat spot range (e.g. 
US high-skilled workers between the ages of 50 and 59)27. The other two are com-
puted using only wage information for workers within industry (manufacturing, 
construction) or only within services28 as shifts between sectors could conceivably 
skew the results. Finally, we explore to what extent the results are influenced by the 
selection of only (male) workers that work full-time for a full year. As an 
27We only trim wages in the flat spot range because trimming the entire wage distribution for the 
computation of changes in the quantity of labor services per hour worked would not affect the median 
wage of workers aged 26-60. The trimming in the flat spot range does have an effect because observa-
tions that are dropped will belong to different age cells (at a given level of education).
28A more fine-grained industrial classification was not feasible. As it is, the number of observations 
per age/education/sector cell sometimes makes computation of sensible price series infeasible. For one-
off  occurrences, we use the baseline price trend. For France and Italy, it is not possible to compute price 
change for the full period due to missing industry classifier variables.
TABLE 6
lIneaR tIMe tRend of laboR seRvIces PeR HouR WoRked In euRoPe, 1990–2013
Low-skilled Medium-skilled High-skilled
Age 26-60 -0.0026* 0.0000 -0.0033
(0.0012) (0.0027) (0.0037)
Age 26-35 -0.0062** -0.0035 -0.0084*
(0.0022) (0.0036) (0.0039)
Age 36-45 -0.0041** -0.0019 -0.0036
(0.0011) (0.0022) (0.0040)
Notes: N=33. Each entry in the table is the coefficient of a linear time trend on the log of labor 
services per hour worked in a given age range and level of educational attainment. All 33 observations 
as well as country fixed effects for the six European countries are included in each regression. 
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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“unrestricted” alternative, we compute prices based on the sample of male workers 
that work at least 5 weekly hours and 5 weeks per year. In Table 8, we show how the 
baseline results in the final column of Table 7 change for these alternatives.29
As the table shows, the different price series influence the change in the quantity 
of labor services per hour worked relative to the baseline estimate. Yet the overall 
pattern remains similar: the US and UK show increasing labor services per hour 
worked for high-skilled workers, while the Continental European countries show pre-
dominantly declines. Relying on the US flat spot range rather than our country-spe-
cific ranges has a varied impact on the Continental European countries, with larger 
declines in France but even a small increase in the Netherlands. Selecting workers 
only in Industry or in Services leads to somewhat smaller changes in the quantity of 
labor services per hour worked in some of the countries, but again, no substantive 
changes. Outliers in wage data do not seem to have a systematic impact as the change 
in the quantity of labor services per hour worked for the Trimmed series is barely 
different from the baseline. Finally, using a less restrictive sampling of workers to 
compute the change in price of labor services per hour worked leads to somewhat 
larger changes, but again, no substantial deviation from the baseline results.
3.4. Discussion of cross-country differences
The patterns in Table 7 are based solely on observed wage changes of 
workers at different age and educational qualifications. By itself, this pro-
vides no indication why particular patterns are observed in some countries 
but not in others – a common problem in this literature, see e.g. Bowlus and 
Robinson (2012) and Lagakos et al. (2018). That said, it is possible to contrast 
some explanations. First, recall that in Figure 2, the fastest increase in wages 
of high-skilled workers in the US between 1995 and 2005 was observed in the 
middle of the age distribution, between approximately the age of 35 and 50 
(see also Table 9). One set of explanations of vintage effects rests on the qual-
ity of students and the quality of (higher) education. For example, if a greater 
share of high-school graduates go on to attend university without an increase 
29The estimates for low and medium-skilled workers do not show a clear pattern and are therefore 
omitted. These data are available on request.
TABLE 7
tHe cHanGe In tHe QuantIty of laboR seRvIces PeR HouR WoRked In euRoPe and tHe unIted 
states betWeen tHe MId-1990s and MId-2000s
Change in the quantity of labor services per hour 
worked
Low-skilled Medium-skilled High-skilled
United States 1995-2005 0.01 0.01 0.19
United Kingdom 1994-2004 -0.09 0.22 0.25
France 1994-2005 -0.04 -0.10 -0.14
Germany 1994-2004 0.01 -0.04 -0.10
Italy 1995-2004 0.00 0.00 -0.09
Netherlands 1993-2004 0.02 0.02 -0.10






























sensItIvIty analysIs foR tHe cHanGe In laboR seRvIces PeR HouR WoRked foR HIGH-skIlled WoRkeRs In euRoPe and tHe unIted states betWeen tHe 
MId-1990s and MId-2000s
Baseline US flat spot Industry Services Trimmed Unrestricted
United States 1995-2005 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.21
United Kingdom 1994-2004 0.25 0.15 0.23 0.19 0.23 0.30
France 1994-2005 -0.14 -0.34 n.a. n.a. -0.15 -0.15
Germany 1994-2004 -0.10 -0.13 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.05
Italy 1995-2004 -0.09 -0.06 n.a. -0.03 -0.07 -0.11
Netherlands 1993-2004 -0.10 0.03 -0.23 -0.03 -0.08 -0.13
Notes: The baseline column corresponds to the final column of Table 8. “US flat spot” uses the flat spot range for the US from Table 2 instead of country-
specific flat spot ranges. ‘Industry’ and ‘Services’ estimates prices using only wage information of workers in those particular sectors, which eliminates any 
impact of pay differentials between broad sectors. “Trimmed” removes the top and bottom 2.5 percent of wage information in the entire flat spot range before 
computing the prices for labor services as in equation (3). “Unrestricted” includes all (male) workers with at least 5 weekly hours worked and 5 weeks worked per 
year, rather than the full-time, full-year restriction. Missing estimates for “Industry” or “Services” are due to missing industry classifier variables or lack of 
observations.
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in the cognitive and non-cognitive skills of these graduates, then we may see 
a decline in the average human capital of university graduates. Alternatively, 
if universities deliver a higher-quality education, then we would expect to see 
university graduates with higher levels of labor services per hour worked. In 
both cases, though, we would expect that these changes would manifest early 
in those workers’ careers.
An alternative explanation focuses on changes in workers’ “human capital 
production function”: newer vintages of workers may be able to more rapidly 
improve their own human capital with experience or on-the-job training. This 
explanation is consistent with the observed pattern of more rapid wage increases of 
US high-skilled workers in the middle of the age distribution: their human capital 
is similar at the start of their careers, but grows more rapidly than that of previous 
cohorts as they gain more experience. A more specific argument would be that 
especially in the 1995 to 2005 period, ICT diffused extensively. Given that ICT is 
complementary to high-skilled workers (e.g. Michaels et al., 2012), the increased 
spread of ICT will have improved the productivity of high-skilled workers. ICT 
may also have improved the productivity of younger workers more than of workers 
in the flat spot range, since workers in the flat spot range are no longer investing in 
improving their human capital, for instance by learning to work with ICT. There is 
some support for this in the OECD’s PIAAC study of adult competencies: based 
on the micro data, we find that younger workers score higher on tests of prob-
lem-solving in IT-rich environments.
Yet this still leaves unexplained why university graduates in the US and UK 
have improved human capital production functions and those in Continental 
European countries have not. To that end, Table 9 summarizes the wage change by 
age group for each country over the same period as highlighted in Table 7. The 
three age groups are defined to match the main differences shown for the US in 
Figure 2, but a different periodization would not lead to different results. For the 
US, the table shows that “old” workers, i.e. those in the flat spot range (50–59 for 
the US, see Table 1) saw some wage declines.30 The young, aged between 26 and 35 
30Note that these wage changes are computed on the actual observed log median wages, while 
Figure 2 uses a LOWESS smoother, where each point in the graph is based on nearby observations for 
the unsmoothed data. This explains why Figure 2 implies a small increase for US high-skilled workers 
in the flat spot range while the table shows a small decrease.
TABLE 9
WaGe cHanGe of HIGH-skIlled WoRkeRs by aGe GRouP (In %)
Country Period Young Middle Old
United States 1995-2005 6.2 12.6 -1.2
United Kingdom 1994-2004 4.9 6.1 1.9
France 1994-2005 -3.2 3.0 0.0
Germany 1994-2004 5.5 21.4 27.6
Italy 1995-2004 3.4 -7.8 -0.7
Netherlands 1993-2004 5.2 13.6 8.5
Notes: The figures in the table are based on the log median wage of high-skilled workers at each 
age at the start and end of the period shown. The young are workers aged 26–35, the middle are 36 
to the start of each country’s flat spot range and the old are workers in the flat spot range (see 
Table 2).
Review of Income and Wealth, Series 0, Number 0, Month 2018
20
© 2018 The Authors. Review of Income and Wealth published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf 
of International Association for Research in Income and Wealth
saw clear increases, while those in the middle of the age distribution, aged 36 to 49 
in the case of the US, saw the strongest gains. In the UK a similar pattern can be 
observed, though the difference between the young and those in the middle of the 
age distribution is not as pronounced.
In Continental European countries, the picture is more mixed. Older workers 
(i.e. those in the flat spot range) saw little to no change in their wage in France 
and Italy, but younger workers (in France) and middle-aged workers (in Italy) saw 
decreases. In Germany and the Netherlands wages increased across all age groups, 
which in the Bowlus and Robinson (2012) method contributes to rising prices of 
labor services of high-skilled workers. Though this pattern is mixed, it is consis-
tent with an argument that ICT had a stronger impact on worker productivity in 
the UK and US, which invested considerably more in these technologies than the 
countries in Continental Europe (see, e.g. van Ark et al., 2008). Of course, we can-
not and do not claim that this is the only argument consistent with these results.
3.5. Implications for Europe-US productivity growth comparisons
Our main finding is that labor services per hour worked of high-skilled 
workers in the US and UK increased by 19–25 percent between 1995 and 2005, 
while Continental European countries register declines of 10–14 percent over the 
similar period. This is a finding that can have important implications for produc-
tivity growth comparisons between Europe and the US. Standard growth 
accounting assumes constant labor services per hour worked over time in esti-
mating (multifactor) productivity growth, but if this assumption is violated, pro-
ductivity growth will have been overestimated in the US and UK and 
underestimated in Continental European countries. Between 1995 and 2005, pro-
ductivity growth in the US was much higher than before or since (Byrne et al., 
2016; Syverson, 2016) and much higher than in Europe (e.g. van Ark et al., 2008). 
If we zoom in on the market economy—which excludes government, health, edu-
cation and real estate—US productivity growth was 1.4 percent on average per 
year between 1995 and 2005, while growth averaged a mere 0.6 percent between 
1975 and 1995 and 0.1 percent between 2005 and 2014.31 In contrast, European 
countries showed notably lower productivity growth over this period, see also 10, 
below. A large literature has aimed to explain this growth gap focusing on expla-
nations such as lower investment in R&D and stricter regulations or the role of 
ICT-producing and ICT-using industries; see e.g. the survey of Ortega-Argilés 
(2012). Yet our analysis points to a hitherto underappreciated element. While 
differences in human capital accumulation have typically been found wanting as 
an explanatory factor, relaxing the “constant labor services per hour worked” 
assumption may provide greater heft to this factor.
To gauge the importance of our findings for the Europe-US productivity 
growth difference, consider the following expression for (Solow residual) produc-
tivity growth:
31The 1975–2005 data are drawn from the 2012 version of the EU KLEMS database; see O’Mahony 
and Timmer (2009). The 2005–2014 average is computed using BLS data for the private business sector, 






























tHe IMPact of cHanGes In tHe QuantIty of laboR seRvIces PeR HouR WoRked by HIGH-skIlled on PRoductIvIty GRoWtH In euRoPe and tHe us, aveRaGe 
annual GRoWtH 1995–2005
Standard growth accounting Adjusted for vintage effects
High-skilled Total labor TFP growth High-skilled Total labor TFP growth
United States 1.9 1.0 1.3 3.7 1.7 0.8
United Kingdom 4.2 1.2 1.0 6.6 1.9 0.5
France 4.4 1.3 0.8 2.9 0.8 1.1
Germany 1.5 -0.5 0.7 0.5 -0.9 0.9
Italy 7.1 1.3 -0.6 6.0 1.2 -0.5
Netherlands 5.9 1.3 0.9 4.9 1.1 1.1
Spain 8.8 4.1 -0.8 7.6 3.8 -0.6
Sources: Growth in high-skilled hours worked and the share in total labor compensation from the WIOD Socio-Economic Accounts (Timmer et al., 2010); 
TFP growth from the EU KLEMS 2012 version (O’Mahony and Timmer, 2009).
Notes: High-skilled labor input growth under standard growth accounting is the average annual growth of hours worked by high-skilled; adjusted for vintage 
effects uses the average annual change in the quantity of labor services per hour worked of high-skilled workers from the final column in Table 8 to adjust the 
trends in hours worked. For Spain we assume the same change in the quantity of labor services per hour worked as for Italy. Total labor input under standard 
growth accounting is based on equation (5); adjusted for vintage effects is based on equation (6). TFP growth is based on equation (4) for standard growth 
accounting; adjusted for vintage effects is based on equation (4’).
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where Δ is the difference operator, A is productivity, V  is value added, K  is 
capital input, L is labor input, and 훼 is the output elasticity of capital—typically 
assumed to be equal to the share of capital income in value added. This implies 
assuming perfect competition in factor and output markets and a constant returns 
to scale production function. Labor input is typically distinguished by type of 
worker, assuming that a given type of worker (denoted by j) provides a constant 
quantity of labor services per hour worked over time. If  that type of worker’s mar-
ginal product equals its marginal cost, the share of total labor compensation flow-
ing to that type of worker (wj) can be used to weight the growth in hours worked 
by that type of worker, Hj:
But if, as we have established, the effective labor input per hour worked of a 
particular type of worker changes over time, we should adjust our computation of 
the growth in overall labor services:
Here Ej is an estimate of effective labor services per hour worked. Note that 
the labor compensation share wj of  each labor type is the same in both equations, 
as total labor compensation does not depend on the division of that sum between 
a price and a quantity component. Denote as ΔlogA∗ the estimate of productiv-
ity growth based on adjusted growth in labor services, so substituting Δ logL by 
Δ logL∗ in equation (4):
To implement equations (5) and (6), we use data on hours worked (Hj) and the 
share of labor compensation (wj) of low-, medium-, and high-skilled workers for 
the United States and the six European countries.32 All Ej are set equal to one, 
except for those of high-skilled workers between 1995 and 2005. For those years 
and that type, we set the annual Ej such that the quantity of labor services per hour 
worked by high-skilled workers increases by the amount shown in the final column 
of Table 7. This assumes that our estimates of the increase in labor services per 
hour worked of (full-time, full-year) male workers is applicable for all workers. As 












(7) Δ logA∗ =Δ logV −훼Δ logK − (1−훼)Δ logL∗
32These data are not available in the 2012 version of EU KLEMS, but are presented in WIOD’s 
Socio-Economic Accounts (Timmer et al. 2015), so we use those data and combine them with TFP 
growth estimates from EU KLEMS. Also note that these shares are not constant over time, so we com-
pute two-period average compensation shares to implement equations (5) and (6) as a Törnqvist index. 
Similarly, we use the two-period average share of capital income in value added in implementing equa-
tions (4) and (4’).
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discussed in Bowlus and Robinson (2012), this may be an overestimation, because 
of changes in the degree of discrimination of women in the labor market. Such 
changes, though, may be relatively modest over a ten year period.
Table 10 presents standard growth accounting results based on EU KLEMS 
as well as figures adjusted for the vintage effects for high-skilled workers that we 
found in Table 7 for the period 1995 to 2005. The average annual growth of  high-
skilled labor input is shown first, with changes in total hours worked shown 
under “Standard growth accounting” and changes in total labor services under 
“Adjusted for vintage effects”. So, for example, total hours worked of  high-
skilled workers grew at an average annual rate of  1.9 percent in the US over this 
period. The final column in Table 7 showed that labor services per hour worked 
of  US high-skilled workers increased by 19 percent over this 10-year period, 
which corresponds to an average annual increase of  1.8 percent. Therefore, labor 
services of  high-skilled increased at an average annual rate of  3.7 percent, as 
shown under “Adjusted for vintage effects”. We can then apply equations (5) and 
(6) to show that total labor services grew 0.7 (1.7-1.0) percentage points faster 
when adjusting for vintage effects than based on standard growth accounting 
assumptions.33 This translates to an average annual TFP growth of  0.8 percent 
when adjusting for vintage effects versus 1.3 percent under standard growth 
accounting.
Under standard growth accounting assumptions, the US showed notably 
faster TFP growth between 1995 and 2005 than the Continental European coun-
tries, and the United Kingdom also had a growth advantage. Within Continental 
Europe, the performance of Italy and Spain is notable, with declines in productiv-
ity. After adjusting for vintage effects, TFP growth in France and the Netherlands 
outstrips that of the other countries. Growth in the US and UK is slower than 
in Germany, though still higher than in Italy and Spain. As recently argued by 
Cette et al. (2016) and Gopinath et al. (2017), the productivity declines in Italy and 
Spain can be traced to a deterioration of the capital allocation process. That dete-
rioration, in turn, was triggered by the decline in real interest rates in the run-up 
to Italy and Spain joining the euro. In other words, the productivity declines in 
these countries were due to exceptional circumstances, while the other five coun-
tries in the table had broadly comparable productivity growth rates between 1995 
and 2005. This implies that the most notable difference between Anglo-Saxon and 
Continental European countries is in their human capital vintage effects.
This finding has implications for the distinction between embodied and dis-
embodied technical change. If  labor is not adjusted for vintage effects, embodied 
technical change will be mixed up with disembodied technical change by ending up 
in the residual, MFP. For the US and the UK, for example, we find that the role 
of disembodied technical change has been overestimated under standard growth 
accounting.
33Labor compensation of high-skilled workers accounted for, on average, 31 percent of total labor 
compensation in the US over this period
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4. conclusIons
This paper has contributed to a growing literature that emphasizes human 
capital accumulation after formal education as an important factor for under-
standing the role of human capital in the process of economic growth and for 
understanding cross-country income differences. In growth accounting (or devel-
opment accounting) a standard assumption is that an hour worked by a worker 
of given type, e.g. high-skilled males, represents a constant amount of labor ser-
vices per hour worked over time. Yet if there are vintage effects, this assumption 
may be violated. Our starting point is recent research that identified vintage (or 
cohort) effects for the US (Bowlus and Robinson, 2012) and we extended their 
methodology to six European countries. The starting point in their methodology 
is that the “constant labor services per hour worked” assumption only holds for 
workers in the later stage of their working life, when the incentive to invest in 
human capital has disappeared—the so-called flat spot range. Vintage effects 
can then be identified from wage changes for younger workers relative to wage 
changes of workers in the flat spot range.
We confirm the findings for the US of  Bowlus and Robinson (2012) of 
vintage effects, with declining labor services per hour worked for low- and 
medium-skilled workers between 1975 and 1995 and rapidly increasing labor 
services per hour worked by high-skilled workers between 1995 and 2005. We 
find similar vintage effects in the UK from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, 
with even larger increases in labor services per hour worked by high-skilled 
workers. In contrast, we find evidence of  declining labor services per hour 
worked by high-skilled workers in the Continental European countries, in a 
notable divergence.
This divergence in vintage effects has a notable impact on the productivity 
growth difference between the US and UK, on the one hand, and the Continental 
European countries—France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Spain—on the 
other hand. The increases of labor services per hour worked in the US and UK 
imply faster growth of labor input and, hence, smaller productivity growth. The 
opposite is the case for the Continental European countries. The net result of these 
adjustments is that the US and UK no longer show faster productivity growth than 
the Continental European countries.
The method we employ does not directly give insights into the reasons 
for why the vintage effects are so different between the Anglo-Saxon countries 
and those in Continental Europe. As we have argued, though, the pattern of 
wages changes by age group is consistent with an argument where rapid ICT 
investment from the mid-1990s onwards had a particularly beneficial effect on 
the productivity of  high-skilled workers in the US and UK, which invested 
most heavily in these technologies. Establishing whether this was indeed the 
main factor is beyond the scope of  this paper. We leave this important issue for 
future research.
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